Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 3

Article 3

7-1-2003

North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002): A Case Note
Dawn M. Weekly

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Dawn M. Weekly, Note, North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002): A Case
Note, 23 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 615 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002): A Case Note
INTRODUCTION

After the unprecedented terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, the government responded with a vast effort aimed at
investigation and prevention, which continues to this day. As part of that
response, several hundred resident aliens were rounded up for alleged
immigration violations and detained, pending removal hearings.' This case
note will consider the opinion in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft,2 which concerns the question of whether the government may
issue a blanket closure order for those deportation hearings and bar the
public and press from attending. Part I of this note will give a brief history
of the precedents in the areas of law implicated by North Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft. Part II will detail the facts of the case. Part III will
discuss the analysis of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision.
Part IV will briefly address the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in a companion case, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,3 which has
created a circuit split. Part V will analyze the Third Circuit's decision in
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft and Part VI will discuss the
practical implications of the holding in this case.
I.

HISTORY

This case actually raises issues in two substantive areas of law:
immigration law and First Amendment constitutional law. It is necessary,
therefore, to give a brief sketch of the applicable precedents and history in
both areas of law that are implicated in this case.

1.

See Molly McDonogh, CircuitsSplit on DeportationHearings, A.B.A. J.

2.

N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).

e-Rep. 18 (Oct. I1, 2002) at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/octlldeporthtml (on
file with Northern Illinois University Law Review).
3.

303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
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IMMIGRATION LAW

In order to properly analyze the decision in this case, it is necessary to
look at the relevant precedents in immigration law that are pertinent to the
decision. First, it is important to note the difference between deportation
and exclusion cases in immigration. 4 Although both are now referred to as
"removal" proceedings, 5 the two are quite different.6 The distinction which
is most important to this case is that "an alien seeking initial admission to
the United States ...has no constitutional rights regarding his application,
7
for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative." As
the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he distinction between an alien who has
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs
throughout immigration law." 8 The implications of the distinction are
borne out in removal hearings as "once an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all
'persons' within the United States, including aliens." 9
Because due
process rights attach to aliens within the United States, "the Executive
Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due
process."' 0 In response, judicial review of immigration law matters is more
deferential in deportation hearings than in exclusion hearings." Thus, in
Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court held that submission of a "facially

4. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). "The deportation hearing is
the usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and
the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United
States seeking admission. The two types of proceedings differ in a number of ways." Id. at
25.
5. Brief for Appellants at 38, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524) (referring to 8 U.S.C. §1229a (1994)).
Landon, 459 U.S. at 25-27 (listing various differences between exclusion and
6.
deportation proceedings).
7. Id. at 32. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-81 (1972) (noting
the plenary power of Congress to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens and that
this power is left exclusively to the political branches of government).
8. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
id.
9.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
10.
See Landon, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (alien seeking deportation hearing instead of
II.
exclusion hearing). See also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (finding that "[a]lthough
Mezei, like the present cases, involves indefinite detention, it differs from the present cases
in a critical respect."). Id. at 693. CompareZadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and Hoang v.
Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002) with Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953) and Yamataya v. Fisher (the Japanese Immigrant case), 189 U.S. 86
(1903) (due process applied in deportation cases challenging detention versus exclusion
cases challenging same).
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legitimate and bona fide reason" was sufficient when reviewing an
exclusion matter,' 2 while deportation proceedings are held to a higher
3
standard of due process.'
In addition to the different standards of judicial review for deportation
as compared to exclusion hearings, courts will also make a distinction
between the power of Congress to set immigration policy and the
procedures chosen to effectuate that policy.14 While courts recognize that
there is "little opportunity for 'substantive' judicial review"' 5 of Congress'
plenary authority over aliens, they have also recognized that the judiciary
has the power and authority to "review these determinations
'procedurally' ' ' 16 to ensure that the methods by which
the immigration
statutes are implemented comply with the Constitution. 17
Thus, the historical precedents of this case in the area of immigration
law establish that the level of judicial review is determined by two factors.
The first factor is whether the matter is concerning an exclusion or
deportation. The second is whether the issue is a substantive or procedural
question.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST

The issues in this case are also grounded in First Amendment
constitutional law. Within this area, the precedents in this case are
specifically concerned with First Amendment rights of access, as opposed
to freedom of expression or association. The seminal case in the area of
First Amendment rights of access is Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia.18 In Richmond, the "Supreme Court created a two part analysis
which a court should apply when determining" if there is a First
Amendment right of access. 19 The first part of the analysis determines

12.
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
13.
See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531.
14.
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694.
15.
Zamora-Garcia v. INS, 737 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1984).
16.
Id.
17.
Hoang, 282 F.3d 1247, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
694; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983)).
18.
448 U.S. 555 (1980). In this case, the trial court closed a murder trial to the
public on the motion of the defendant, claiming a public trial would improperly influence
jurors. It was the fourth trial of the defendant, the first three being declared mistrials for
various reasons. The Court held a qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials attached and that absent an overriding interest articulated in specific findings, criminal
trials must be open to the public. Id.
19.
Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Minn.
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whether "a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches" to
the proceeding. 20 To make this determination, the court will first analyze
whether the "experience prong" of the analysis will show that "the place
21
general public.
and process have historically been open to the press and
Then, under the "logic prong", the court will consider "whether public
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question., 22 In making this logic determination, courts look to
six factors: whether public access (1) promotes informed discussion of
governmental affairs, (2) promotes the public perception of fairness, (3) has
a significant community therapeutic value, (4) serves as a check on corrupt
practices, (5) enhances the performance of those involved, or (6)
discourages perjury.23 If both prongs of the test are fulfilled, a qualified
right of access arises and the court will proceed to the second step of the
analysis. The court will then ask whether closure is "necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, [which] is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." 24
1.

Applications of the Richmond Newspapers Test

In applying the Richmond Newspapers test, courts have found a First
25
Amendment right of access to the following proceedings: criminal trials,
28 formal administrative fact27
26
civil trials, voir dire, preliminary hearings,
jury tampering hearings, 30 post-trial
finding hearings, 29 mid-trial
1 judicial disqualification proceedings, 32 and pre3
examinations of jurors,

1986).
20.

MI).

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,9 (1986) (Press-Enterprise

id. at8.
21.
Id.
22.
United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982).
23.
24. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (PressEnterprise 1) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07
(1982)).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
25.
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
26.
Press-Enterprise1,464 U.S. 501 (1984).
27.
Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550
28.
(3d Cir. 1982).
Soc'y of Prof 1.Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F. Supp 569 (D. Utah 1985).
29.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 156 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.
30.
1998).
31.
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
32.
In re NBC v. Presser, 828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987).
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trial class action hearings.33 In addition, courts have found a First
Amendment right of access to the following government information
and/or documents: documents submitted to a federal agency in response to
an investigation, 34 USDA voter lists, 35 certain court documents, 36 and bills
37
of particulars.
More important to the current case is when a First Amendment right
of access has not been found. Courts have found closure to proceedings
warranted only when the proceedings involved important rights that
outweighed the right of access.38 Courts have been much more likely to
find no right of access when the access at issue is to government
documents, information, or facilities rather than to the proceeding itself. 39

33.
Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (1 Ith Cir. 1983).
34.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
35.
Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992).
36.
In re Cont'l Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding public
access to report of Special Litigation Committee in derivative suit); Rodgers v. U.S. Steel
Corp. 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding public access to backup documentation in
settlement negotiations).
37.
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).
38.
E.g., In re Newark Morning Ledger Co., 260 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
right of access did not attach to contempt hearings since they concerned grand jury
testimony, which is historically secret); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658
(8th Cir. 1984) (finding it was harmless error for court to have closed proceedings without
hearing press' objections to closure since the proceedings involved trade secrets and
defendant's property interests in those secrets overrode press' right to access).
39.
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding protective
order of sealed pre-trial discovery did not violate First Amendment because discovery
documents not traditionally a public source of information); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978) (holding press had no right of access to areas of jail facilities above and
beyond that of the public); United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding no right of access to student disciplinary records); United States v. Gonzales, 150
F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding no right of access to backup documentation of fees and
expenses for court-appointed counsel); Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding
no right of access to A Capone's tax returns); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797
F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding no right of access to investigative information used for
hearings of Department of Environmental Resources); United States v. Ressam, 221 F.
Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (holding no right of access to sealed pleading in terrorist
case due to overriding interest in security and no alternatives less restrictive); In re
Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding no
right of access to sealed discovery documents in civil case until after trial); United States v.
Sealed Search Warrants, 28 Media L. Rep. 1151 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding no right of access to
sealed search warrants).
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NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT - THE FACTS '

Ten days after the September I I terrorist attacks, Chief United States
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a directive to all Immigration
Judges and Court Administrators outlining security measures to be applied
in the class of cases involving detainees who might have connections to or
knowledge of the terrorist attacks.' ° The deportation hearings concerning
these aliens who were termed "special interest" cases were to be held in
proceedings closed to the press, public, family members, friends, and
visitors. 4' A complaint was filed on March 6, 2002, by plaintiffs North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. and New Jersey Law Journal, alleging a violation
42
of their First Amendment rights and seeking a preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
43
claim, which was granted in part and denied in part by the District Court.
The District Court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding
the plaintiffs "have demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits" as to the First Amendment claim.44 After the District and Appellate
Courts denied the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, the
Supreme Court granted a stay.45

N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (D.N.J.
40.
2002) rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
Memorandum from Hon. Michael J. Creppy (Sept. 21, 2001) available at
41.
2
Creppy
http://news. findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy09 101 memo.pdf [hereinafter
outlined in the Creppy Directive, were to
as
Directive]. Other measures to be implemented,
remove all information about the cases from printed court calendars, a restriction of
information on the INS' 1-800 number, and a prohibition on confirming or denying whether
such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing.
N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
42.
id. at 291. The court held that Plaintiffs' claim for violation of INS regulation 8
43.
C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 240.10(b) was not met. Id. at 303.
Id. at 302. The lower court held the case was governed by the Richmond
44.
Newspapers test and that the test should be applied to deportation hearings specifically, and
not, as the government had argued, to administrative proceedings in general. The court held
under the Richmond Newspapers "experience prong" that deportation hearings had a history
of openness dating back to 1903, as well as a statutory rebuttable presumption of openness
since 1964. Id. at 300 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2002)). Under the "logic prong" the court
held "there is no doubt that deportation proceedings inherently involve a governmental
process that affects a person's liberty interest and, as the Supreme Court has held, must
comport with constitutional guarantees of due process." Id. at 301.
Ashcroft v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2655 (2002) (order granting
45.
a stay pending appeal).
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NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT- THE COURT'S
OPINION

A.

OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION AND CONSIDERATION OF
THE WATSON DECLARATION AND THE CREPPY DIRECTIVE

As a starting point, the Appeals Court gave an overview of the opinion
of the District Court, noting the lower court found the Richmond
Newspapers test was applicable and had been met. 46 The opinion very
quickly foreshadowed what the Appeals Court's ultimate decision would be
when it turned its sights on the lower court decision's "logic prong"
analysis. They noted: "[s]ignificantly .... in evaluating the logic prong, the
court did not consider the policies militating against media access. 47 The
Appeals Court's opinion then considered the dangers of security breaches
as outlined in a declaration filed by Dale Watson, Counterterrorism Chief
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 48
The so-called "Watson
Declaration" maintained that open proceedings might betray to terrorists
what information the government does or does not possess, even from
"details that seem innocuous in isolation" which "immigration judges
cannot be expected accurately to assess. 4 9 Although they noted the fact
that "existing caselaw on the logic prong has discussed only the policies
favoring openness," the Third Circuit was "satisfied that the logic prong
must consider the flip side of the coin.",50 Their reasoning was that since
the Supreme Court in Richmond asked whether access played a positive
role in the process, there must also be consideration of "whether it is
potentially harmful.'
Flipping a traditional First Amendment analysis on its head, after its
brief overview, the Appeals Court's first order of business was to address
the Creppy Directive and the compelling interests the government may
have in the closure of deportation hearings.5 2 They noted the Department
of Justice, which oversees the INS, designated the cases of these aliens as
"special interest" cases because the aliens "might have connections
with, or
possess information pertaining to, terrorist activities against the United

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 300-03.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
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States.,53 The court then pointed out a "litany of harms" which may flow
from open hearings.54
B.

APPLICABILITY OF THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST

Next the court considered the applicability of the Richmond
Newspapers test to this case. The court rejected the government's
argument that the First Amendment should not be extended in this case
because deportation hearings are non-Article III political branch
proceedings.5 The government contended that Richmond and its progeny
extended First Amendment rights to criminal proceedings only because
they "expressly relied upon the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public
trial." 56 The court reasoned that this approach is precluded because the
Supreme Court, in its Richmond decision, made "no suggestion that the
Sixth Amendment is crucial to the right of access. 57 In addition, the court
in the Third Circuit has applied the Richmond Newspapers test previously
in contexts other than criminal proceedings, so this reasoning was
rejected.5 8 The court held "[t]hese precedents demonstrate that in this
Court, Richmond Newspapers is a test broadly applicable to issues of
access to government proceedings, including removal. 59

53. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d at 202.
54. Id. at 203. In their brief, the government cited several findings from the
Watson Declaration as the basis of their contention of harms. Among these are that the
terrorists "will be on notice" that the U.S. is "aware of links" which may come out "for
example, if evidence is offered about a particular phone number" connected to a terrorist
organization; or terrorists "may even be able to determine what sources and methods" the
U.S. has used to determine those links. Additionally, the government says terrorist
organizations could "alter their future attack plans . .. obstruct or disrupt pending
proceedings by destroying evidence, threatening potential witnesses, or targeting the hearing
itself," or threatening or deterring aliens from "cooperating with the government's ongoing
investigation." Brief for Appellants at 7-8, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2524).
55. Reply Brief for Appellants at 4, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2524).
56. Id.
57. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 208.
58. Id. (citing Whiteland Woods v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3d
Cir. 1999) (planning commission meetings); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F2d
1164 (3d Cir. 1986) (state agency investigation hearings); First Amend. Coalition v. Judicial
Inquiry & Review Board, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (judicial disciplinary hearings); and
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil trials).
59. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 208-09.
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C.
APPLYING THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST - STEP ONE: THE
EXPERIENCE PRONG

Having found the Richmond Newspapers test applicable, the court
turned to the first step of the test, analyzing first the "experience prong",
then the "logic prong." Under the "experience prong", the court showed an
almost wholesale acceptance of the arguments made by the government.
These arguments centered on four main contentions: (1)the burden of
proof in this prong is on the plaintiffs; (2) the proper analysis for the
history of openness is to administrative proceedings in general; (3) even if
deportation hearings specifically are analyzed there is no history of
openness to satisfy the test; and (4) extending a right of access to
'6
deportation hearings would result in "perverse consequences. 0
1.

Burden of Proof

In their reply brief, the government maintained that "plaintiffs
themselves bear the burden of demonstrating an affirmative tradition of
access in order to satisfy the first prong of the Richmond Newspapers
test.",6' The court accepted this contention, stating that the language of
Richmond itself "seems to place the burden of proof on the party alleging a
First Amendment right., 62 The rest of the court's analysis of the
''experience prong" is taken in this light.
2.

Administrative Proceedings or DeportationHearings?

Seemingly accepting the government's contention that the proper
analysis of the experience prong is to look at the tradition of administrative
proceedings in general, and not deportation hearings specifically,63 the

60.
See Brief for Appellants, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2425); Reply Brief for Appellants, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2425).
61.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 15, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2524).
62.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209. The court refers to the language of
Press-EnterpriseIt which states that a court "must consider whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general public ...[and] whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." Id.
at 209 (quoting Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
63.
Brief for Appellants at 19-29, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2425).
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court began its analysis with the question: "[i]s there an historical right of
access to government proceedings generally?" 64 They then noted that the
history of access to "political branch proceedings" is quite different than
the history noted in Richmond and Publicker.65 They referred to their
opinion in Capital Cities Media66 where the court found "the Framers
67
themselves rejected any unqualified right of access to political branches.
The court looked at various thoughts from the Framers as to just how open
the new government should be.68 They also noted Congress itself initially
met behind closed doors for several decades, only routinely opening to the
public in the mid-1970s. 69 The court next approvingly noted the argument
made by the government that "many hearings before administrative
°
agencies" have a tradition of closing "sensitive" proceedings.7
While never specifically stating that they agreed that the experience
test in this case should be analyzed in the context of administrative
proceedings in general, the court did indeed make this analysis. The court
did not even address the argument of the newspapers that the proper
analysis is of the particular proceeding itself. 7' Instead, the court stated:
"[flaced with this litany of administrative hearings that are closed to the
public . . . [the newspapers] submit that, despite frequent closures
throughout the administrative realm, deportation proceedings in particular
boast a history of openness sufficient to meet the Richmond Newspapers
that claim.7 3
requirement. 7 2 The court then said they disagree with

N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209.
64.
Id.
65.
797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
66.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209.
67.
Id. The court notes Patrick Henry, who was a leading opponent of government
68.
secrecy, conceded that not all government activities should be publicized, and that Thomas
Jefferson said "some [executive] proceedings, at least, should remain known to their
executive functionary only." Id. (quoting Randall, 3 Life of Thomas Jefferson 211 (1858)
reprintedin Wiggins, Freedom of Secrecy 67-68 (1964).
Id. at 209.
69.
Id. at 210. The government submits examples of administrative hearings they
70.
denote as "potentially sensitive" which are either "presumptively closed" or "may be
closed" in its brief. Some of those listed include: hearings on Social Security disability
claims, administrative disbarment hearings, hearings before the Merit Systems Protection
Board, and hearings on adverse passport decisions. Brief for Appellant at 26-27, N. Jersey
Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-2524).
.71.
Brief for Appellees at 27, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524). The newspapers argue the "Supreme Court and this Court have eschewed
sweeping generalities and repeatedly held that the proper inquiry should focus on the
particulartype of proceeding at issue." Id. (citing Press-Enterprise1I, 478 U.S. at 9).
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 210-1I.
72.
Id.at 211. It should be noted, however, the dissent believes the Richmond
73.

2003l
3.

NORTH JERSEYMEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT

History of Openness in DeportationHearings

As noted previously, the court placed the burden of proof in the
"experience prong" on the newspapers.74
Their analysis, therefore,
considered a couple of the newspapers' arguments, but found the tradition
of open deportation hearings "too recent and inconsistent to support a First
Amendment right of access. '75 Initially, the court found the first argument
of the newspapers the most persuasive.
Since the first immigration
regulations in the 1890s, exclusion hearings have always been expressly
closed, but deportation hearings have not.76 In addition, since that time,
Congress has repeatedly re-enacted provisions closing exclusion hearings,
but has never authorized general closure for deportation hearings.77 The
court .noted the current statutory language explicitly states that "[a]ll
hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public except
that . . . [f]or the purpose of protecting . . . the public interest, the
78
Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a closing hearing.
The court did not address, however, other arguments put forth by the
newspapers in support of a tradition of openness in deportation hearings.
The first such argument was that even deportation hearings that are
conducted by a recently created anti-terrorism court are presumptively open
to the public under legislation enacted in 1996.79 Next, they pointed to the
holding from "the one federal decision to squarely address the issue of
public access to deportation hearings prior to the Creppy directive" which
held the "INS regulation 'is but one of countless manifestations of a public
policy centuries old that judicial proceedings, especially those in which the
life or liberty of an individual is at stake, should be subject to public
scrutiny. ' ' 8° Finally, the court did not address, but rejected in effect, the

Newspapers test is met. Id. at 221 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
74.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
75.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 211.
76.
Brief for Appellees at 30, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524).
77.
Id. at 32.
78.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.27).
79.
Brief for Appellees at 34, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524). Their brief goes on to point out that "[tihe anomaly of the government's
position is that it is seeking to conduct closed hearings in cases where there are no charges
of terrorism, but if there were such charges, adjudicated by the new anti-terrorism court,
there would be no dispute that the hearing would be open." Id. at 34 n. 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1534(a)(2)).
80.
Id. (quoting Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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tends to prove that the general rule
argument that having limited exceptions
81
closure.
than
rather
is of openness
While those arguments were not addressed, the court noted the
government's arguments that even though there is a presumption of
openness in deportation hearings, they have frequently been closed to the
general public. 82 The government noted that deportation hearings have in
the past been conducted in places where there is no general right of public
access, and that thousands of hearings are still held in federal and state
prisons each year. 83 Armed with these two rebuttal arguments, the court
found that deportation hearings do not "boast a tradition of openness
sufficient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers."84 They found that although
the 1964 regulations "did create a presumption of openness, a recent-and
is hardly the stuff of which
rebuttable-regulatory presumption
85
Constitutional rights are forged.,
The court did consider one final argument of the newspapers that
"within the geographic confines of the Third Circuit, a showing of
openness at common law is not required., 86 The court then walked through
the three cases decided in the Third Circuit, as well as one Supreme Court
case, which are relevant to that argument. First, they noted that United
States v. Criden87 was a case decided before the holding of PressEnterprise H so their language in that case that they "do not think historical
analysis is relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right
of access to pretrial criminal proceedings" was dicta. 88 Since PressEnterprise II was subsequently decided by the Supreme Court, they were

Brief for Amici Curiae at 20, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
81.
2002) (No. 02-2524). "Limited exceptions to openness actually underscore the general rule
of presumptively open proceedings, subject to closure only where exigent circumstances
require, such as where the privacy of an abused alien child was in question." Id. The dissent,
however, seems to accept this argument by noting that, as deportation hearings have
exceptions to the general presumption of openness, so too, do criminal proceedings, without
destroying their tradition of openness. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 222 (Scirica,
C.J., dissenting).
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212.
82.
83.
Brief for Appellants at 40, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524).
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212.
84.
85.
Id. at 213. Conversely, the dissent posits that since "the Founders 'could not
have anticipated the vast growth of the administrative state,"' the tradition of access to be
analyzed should be that of a "particular proceeding within the history of the modern
administrative state." id. at 222-23 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 213.
86.
675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding a right of access to pretrial hearings even
87.
though no right existed at common law).
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213.
88.
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now bound by its language that "the role of history in the access
determination is 'crucial."' 89 In addition, they note that Criden, as well as
United States v. Simone,90 were both based on criminal proceedings. 9'
These decisions, therefore, used the overwhelming historical support for
access in other phases of the criminal process "in the absence of a distinct
tradition in the process itself., 92 They also distinguished their statement in
Whiteland Woods v. Township of West Whiteland93 that .'[w]e have no
hesitation in holding Whiteland Woods had a constitutional right of access
to the Planning Commission meeting"'94 as being a broad statement that was
dicta and they "do not follow it here."
The court then turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority where the Court
found that "because Federal Maritime Commission adjudications 'walk[],
talk[], and squawk[] like a civil lawsuit.., they are the type of proceedings
from which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity
when they agreed to enter the Union.- ' 9 Although the court said they
"agree that on a procedural level, deportation hearings and civil trials are
practically indistinguishable," they "do not believe that the Supreme Court
intended in Ports Authority to import the full panoply of constitutional
rights to any administrative proceeding that resembles a civil trial. 96 The
court did not address the other cases put forth by the newspapers as ones in
which a history of openness was found
despite being "creatures of statute"
97
which "post-date the Constitution.,

89.
Id.
90.
14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding a right of access to post-trial examination of
jurors for potential misconduct).
91.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213-14.
92.
Id. at 214.
93.
193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding no right of access to videotape Planning
Commission meeting).
94.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 214 (quoting Whiteland Woods v.
Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999)).
95.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 214 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)) (internal citations omitted).
96.
Id. at 215. The court notes that while there is a fundamental right underpinning
the holding in FMC (sovereign immunity), "there is no fundamental right to attend
government proceedings underpinning the Newspapers' alleged right to attend deportation
proceedings." Id.
97.
Brief for Appellees at 24, N. Jersey Media Group 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524). The newspapers list the following cases: Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. I
(1 986) (finding a right of access for preliminary hearings by analogizing to criminal trials in
general); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding bills of particular
are a modern trend with a brief history); and In re NBC v. Presser, 828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.
1987) (relying on history from 1924-1984).
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Perverse Consequences

While the court did not completely accept the government's argument
that extending a right of access in this case would "produce several bizarre
consequences that the Framers cannot have intended and that courts should
not impose by fiat," 98 they did agree with their contention that "because
there was no pre-constitutional tradition of access to administrative
hearings, all such rights of access . . . must originally be provided by

legislative or executive grace." 99 Since that is the case, were the court to
extend a right of access in this case it would lead to the "perverse
consequence" of compelling "the Executive to close its proceedings to the
public ab initio or risk creating a constitutional right of access that would
preclude it from closing them in the future."' ° The court did not address
the argument that the very benefit of the 0Richmond Newspapers test is that
it precludes an "all or nothing approach."'1
D. APPLYING THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST - STEP TWO: THE LOGIC
PRONG

In this step of the analysis, the court did not rely on the arguments
made on either side. Instead, they added to the standard question of
whether "public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning
of the particular process in question' 0 2 the flip side of the coin: namely,
"the extent to which openness impairs the public good."' 1 3 The court
reasoned that the logic prong "does not do much work" in the Richmond
Newspapers test.1°4 Being unable to find a case in which a proceeding

98.
Brief for Appellant at 34-35, N. Jersey Media Group 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2524).
99.
Id.
100.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 216.
101.
Brief for Appellees at 27, N. Jersey Media Group 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524). Appellees further argue that focusing on the particulartype of proceeding at
issue (deportation hearings), rather than administrative proceedings in general, allows the
Richmond Newspapers test to "take into account the unique traditions and characteristics of
a given proceeding," further mitigating the "all or nothing" outcome anticipated by the
government and the court. Id. The dissent agrees, stating, "[tihat the historical tradition
supports access to deportation hearings does not imply the existence of a qualified right of
access for all administrative proceedings." N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 223 (Scirica,
C.J. dissenting).
102.
Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
103.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217.

104.

Id.
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passed the experience test but did not pass the logic test, they found it
"difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public
would not have a First Amendment right of access" if only the positive role
of the proceeding is assessed. 105
Having thus changed the test, the court then went through a laundry
list of "potential dangers" presented by open deportation hearings as
gleaned from the Watson Declaration.1°6 The court did note that these
dangers may be speculative, but their analysis of these dangers under the
logic prong precludes the strict scrutiny which would be required were a
fundamental First Amendment right to have been found under Richmond
Newspapers.07 While the court noted it is being very deferential in its
analysis, they stressed this was not due to the plenary power of Congress
over immigration matters, a theory advanced by the government. 108 But,
rather, their deference was due to the government's expertise in national
security. 109
It should be noted that the dissent agrees with the majority that the
logic prong should be changed, as its "inquiry cannot consist merely of a
recitation of the factors supporting open proceedings." '"10 However, the
dissent's divergence along this path is not as broad as the majority's. The
dissent stated, "[t]he logic analysis set forth by the Supreme Court is
directed at a particular structural type of proceedings - in this case,
deportation hearings - not a subset based on specific designations such as
terrorism.""' 1 Pointing to Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court where
the Supreme Court rejected analysis of a particular subset of criminal trials

105.
Id.
106.
Id. at 218. These seven dangers are: I) revealing sources and methods of
investigation; 2) allowing terrorists to glean patterns of entry that do or don't work from
entry information; 3) allowing terrorists to determine which cells they should or should not
use in the future; 4) allowing terrorists to find out that a particular member is detained which
may accelerate an attack; 5) allowing terrorist organizations to interfere by creating false or
misleading evidence; 6) exposing special interest aliens to the stigma of having been thus
categorized; and 7) exposing patterns of what behavior merit such closure to terrorists if
done on a case-by-base basis. Id. at 218-19.
107.
Id. at 219 n.14.
108.
Brief for Appellants at 53-58, N. Jersey Media Group 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2524). The government addresses this issue in its "strict scrutiny"
arguments, but due to the change of the logic prong by the court, the opinion never gets to
the last step of the Richmond Newspapers test and instead addresses the deference issue
under the logic prong.
109.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219.
110.
Id. at 224.
Ill.
Id.
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when applying the Richmond Newspapers test,'2 the dissent said, "we must
consider the value of openness in deportation hearings generally, not its
benefits and detriments in 'special interest' deportation hearings in
particular." '"1 3 Since deportation hearings can involve any number of
grounds, to analyze "the demands of national security under the logic
prong" would "permit concerns relevant only to a discrete class of cases to
right of access to any of the broad range of
determine there is no qualified
14
proceedings."''
deportation
E.

THE OPINION'S CONCLUSION

In its conclusion, the court addressed the importance and implications
of this case. Basically the court believed that even though they gave no
judicial remedy in this case, the "powerful check of political accountability
on Executive discretion" is always available. ' 5 They noted the aliens who
are subject to deportation are not the persons most directly affected by the
Creppy Directive, rather it is the media. 1 6 Ultimately, the court seems to
feel the real threat to democracy is not when government begins closing
doors, it is when future terrorist attacks are not protected by whatever
means available. '17
IV. THE COMPANION CASE - DETROIT FREE PRESS V. ASHCROFT

A quick overview of the companion case in the Sixth Circuit, Detroit
8 is appropriate at this point. This case also
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 11
challenges the Creppy Directive and its implications on First Amendment
rights of access to deportation hearings, albeit only as affecting one
particular alien." 19 In this case, a bond hearing was conducted for Rabih

112.
457 U.S. 596 (1981).
113.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 225.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 220.
116.
Id. at 221. They also point out, "[als always, these aliens are given a heavy
measure of due process." Id.
117.
See id. at 221. (quoting a WASHINGTON POST article which stated: "A real
threat could arise, however, should the government fail in its mission to prevent another
September II. If that happens, the public will demand, and will get, immense restrictions
on liberties.")
118.
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
119.
Id.
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Haddad, whose case was termed "special interest." 2 Haddad, who had a
tourist visa, was subject to deportation for overstaying his visa., 2' In
addition, the government further suspected the Islamic charity Haddad
operates may supply funds to terrorist organizations.1 22 Several people
sought to attend his deportation hearing, including his family, Congressman
John Conyers, and several newspapers. 123 After being denied access to
Haddad's closed hearings, the newspapers filed complaints for injunctive
24
and declaratory relief under the First Amendment, among other claims. 1
In contrast to the concerns enunciated in the conclusion of the North
Jersey Media Group, the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press, began its
opinion by putting its own editorial spin on the questions presented in their
case. They characterized this situation as one where:
the Executive Branch seeks to take this safeguard [an
informed public] away from the public by placing its
actions beyond public scrutiny. Against non-citizens, it
seeks the power to secretly deport a class if it unilaterally
calls them "special interest" cases. The Executive Branch
seeks to uproot people's lives, outside the public eye, and
behind a closed door. Democracies die behind closed
doors. 25
The court then affirmed the district court's order granting a
preliminary injunction against the government from enforcing the Creppy
Directive. 126
After a lengthy discussion of the plenary power of Congress over
immigration matters, an argument which was only barely addressed in
North Jersey Media Group, the Sixth Circuit moved on to apply the
Richmond Newspapers test. The court found Richmond was applicable in
this case because immigration proceedings are quasi-judicial and resemble
criminal and civil trials. 2 7 Applying the test, they found 1) deportation

120.
121.

Id. at 684.
Id.

125.
126.

Id. at 683.
Id.

122.
123.
124.
127.

Id.
Id.
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 694-700.
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proceedings have traditionally been accessible to the public and 2) public
access plays a significant positive role in deportation hearings. 28
Unlike their counterparts in the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit court
lent more credence to Justice Brennan's words in his concurring opinion in
Richmond that "what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a
particular government process is important in terms of that very
process."'129 While the Sixth Circuit was willing to find "a brief historical
tradition might be sufficient to establish a First Amendment right of access
where the beneficial effects of access to that process are overwhelming and
uncontradicted," they found that deportation hearings have, indeed,
historically been open. 30 Addressing the fact that deportation hearings
have been held in places such as hospitals or prisons, they found
that this is
3
1 1
openness.
of
one
been
has
policy
general
the
and
norm
the
not
Moving to the final step of the Richmond Newspapers test, the Sixth
Circuit found, under a strict scrutiny analysis: (1) the government cites
compelling interests; (2) the Creppy Directive does not require
particularized findings; and (3) the Creppy Directive is not narrowly
tailored. 32 The court said preventing terrorism is a compelling interest and
they deferred to the government's judgment in that regard.' 33 However, the
Creppy Directive is not narrowly tailored because the government "offers
no persuasive argument as to why [its] concerns cannot be addressed on a
case-by-case basis."' 134 In particular, the court noted that if the alien is
somehow connected to terrorism and they are deemed a "special interest"
case, "a terrorist group capable of sophisticated intelligence-gathering
would certainly be made aware that one of its operatives, or someone
connected to a particular
terrorist plot, has disappeared into the
' 35
Government's custody.'

128. Id. at 700-05.
129. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan,
J.,
concurring).
130. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
131.
Id. at 703.
132. Id. at 705-07.
133. Id. at 707.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 708.
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ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION IN NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP, INC. V.
ASHCROFT

The greatest strength of North Jersey Media Group opinion lies in its
proper application of the Richmond Newspapers test to this case and its
consideration of the national security interests at stake. It can hardly be
disputed that these interests are indeed compelling and they need to be
considered. However, in elevating these interests to being of paramount
importance, the Third Circuit's holding in this case risks becoming seen as
being akin to the "Japanese Internment" cases. As is well-settled today, in
those cases, the Supreme Court erroneously allowed the traditional
requirements of strict scrutiny to give way to prejudice and hysteria by
giving greater weight to the war136 powers of the president than to its
obligation of constitutional review.
Of the areas where the opinion diverges from precedent, its most
major departure is in its analysis under the logic prong.' 37 The court, in
effect, turns the logic prong inquiry into a balancing test when it said
"[a]ny inquiry into whether a role is positive must perforce consider
whether it is potentially harmful."'' 38 This divergence from precedent is
problematical for a couple of reasons. First, the logic prong was not meant
to be an independent inquiry, nor a cursory look at merely "positive"
factors of openness. Additionally, subjecting the logic prong to a balancing
test is an approach that has been rejected by a majority of the Supreme
Court. 139

A.
THE LOGIC PRONG IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY NOR A CURSORY
EXAMINATION

As originally devised in Richmond, the logic prong was not meant to
be an independent inquiry, nor was it merely meant "to determine whether
openness serves some good."' 4 In its opinion, the Third Circuit notes that

136.
See generally Arval A. Morris, Justice, War, and the Japanese-American
Evacuation and Internment, 59 WASH. L. REV. 843 (1984) (book review).
137.
In addition to its diverging analysis, the holding itself diverges from
precedential cases where the issue has been a First Amendment right of access to
government proceedings. Of the federal cases to apply the Richmond Newspapers test to
this issue, all have found a qualified fundamental First Amendment right based on the
experience and logic prongs, except this one.
138.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200-01.
139.
See infra, text accompanying note 150.
140.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217.
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"[a]lthough existing caselaw on the logic prong has discussed only the
policies favoring openness, we are satisfied that the logic prong must
consider the flip side of the coin."' 41 They reason that since the Supreme
role,' 142
Court has asked "whether public access plays a significant positive
143
any inquiry must also perforce consider whether it is potentially harmful.
The Third Circuit has added emphasis to the word "positive", which is an
over-reliance on the Supreme Court's wording in Press-EnterpriseII that
ultimately leads to a mis-interpretation of the function of the logic prong.
While Press-EnterpriseH does indeed characterize the question as whether
access plays a significant positive role, the Third Circuit adds emphasis to
the word "positive" when it is really a generalization that, when
emphasized, changes the meaning of the test. 144
A close reading of Richmond will show that consideration of the role
openness plays in a proceeding was meant to determine if there are reasons
for openness which support and give importance to the historical evidence
that proceedings have been open. 145 In Richmond, after an extensive look
at the history of criminal trials, Justice Burger in his opinion stated: "the
historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had
long been presumptively open. This is no quirk of history; rather it has
long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American
trial." 46 But instead of ending its inquiry here, the Court went on to
demonstrate that it's not just openness, but also the importance of that
openness which is essential to the inquiry. The Court referred to Hale and
Blackstone as understanding that importance to the proper functioning of a
trial: "it gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and

Id. at 200.
141.
142.
Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
143.
Id.
A look at the three Supreme Court predecessors to Press-EnterpriseII, will
144.
show that none refer to "factors that play a positive role." Rather, Press-EnterpriseI refers
to the importance openness plays in the administration ofjustice. 464 U.S. 501,508 (1984);
Globe Newspaper refers to the special value and particularlysignificant role of openness.

457 U.S. 596, 606, 611 (1982); and finally, Richmond itself refers to the value and
importance of openness. 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J. concurring). These are all
much more than merely "positive factors."
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 573. "From this
145.
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past,
we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial under our system of justice." id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 569.
146.
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decisions based on secret bias or partiality." 147 This is the genesis of the
logic prong and it is not an independent inquiry, but rather it plays a
supporting role in demonstrating the importance of openness. It is because
of this importance that a fundamental right attaches to the proceeding. Had
criminal trials merely had a history of being open to the public with no
important reasons for it, it is likely that the Supreme Court in Richmond
would not have found access to the proceeding to be a fundamental right to
which the First Amendment and a strict scrutiny analysis would apply.
Indeed, as Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Globe
Newspaper, "Richmond Newspapers rests upon our long history of open
criminal trials and the special value, for both public and accused, of that
openness." 148
In sum, the logic prong is an inquiry which supports the finding of the
experience prong. It determines whether the tradition of openness exists
for important reasons, or is merely a byproduct of the proceeding itself. In
its opinion, however, the Third Circuit changes the inquiry of the logic
prong into a balancing test, asking whether there are policies militating
against access. 149 This balancing test, in effect, obfuscates the purpose of
the inquiry.
B.

THE LOGIC PRONG IS NOT A BALANCING TEST

The Supreme Court has rejected a balancing test approach to cases of
First Amendment rights of access.' 50 In Globe Newspaper, Justices Burger
and Rehnquist felt the proper test was to "balance the competing interests:
the interests of the media for instant access, against the interest of the State
'
of public testimony."151
in protecting child rape victims from the trauma
The majority firmly rejected this approach and instead followed
Richmond's analysis, looking to the history and importance of openness to
criminal trials, and then applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the mandatory
closure required by the state statute. 52 For these reasons, turning the logic
prong into a balancing test is not the proper analysis and this approach has
been firmly rejected by the Supreme Court.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
457 U.S. at 611 (emphasis added).
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. at 616.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 603-06.
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Even if a balancing test in the logic prong were a valid reading of the
53
intent of Richmond, the Third Circuit did not perform the test properly. 1
The dissenting judge in the opinion agreed that it is proper to consider the
54
countervailing interests of national security during the logic prong.
However, if such an analysis is correct, this consideration should be applied
to deportation hearings in general, not to the "special interest" class of
cases.' 55 As the dissent pointed out, such an analysis leads to "concerns
relevant only to a discrete class of cases to determine there is no qualified
56
right of access to any of the broad range of deportation proceedings." 1
C.

INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS OF THE CATEGORY OF PROCEEDINGS TO

BE ANALYZED

Unfortunately, misapplications such as those noted above, and the
general inconsistent nature in which the categories (administrative
proceedings in general versus deportation hearings specifically) are
analyzed, are another key divergence from precedent in this decision. The
majority did not commit fully to identifying whether it is administrative
proceedings, deportation hearings, or the "special interest" cases of
deportation hearings which should be analyzed under Richmond
Newspapers.157 This lack of commitment leads to erratic applications of
the different facets of analysis to different categories of proceedings. 58
The court analyzed both administrative proceedings generally and
deportation hearings specifically under the experience prong.159
Unfortunately, this diverges from precedent where the analysis is to the
particularprocess in question. 60 Illustratively, in prior precedents, when

153. See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 224-25 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id.at 224.
155.
Id. at 225.
156. Id.
157.
See Id.
158. Id. Indeed, at times the opinion even refers to the different categories of
proceedings within the same paragraph. See especially page 201 of the opinion where the
court begins a paragraph by referring to deportation hearings and its similarities to civil
trials, but ends by contrasting administrative proceedings which are closed by statute. Id. at
201.
159.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209-15.
160.
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980). "[T]he case
for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of
public entrde to particular proceedings or information." Id. (emphasis added); PressEnterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. "[T]he Court has traditionally considered whether public
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question." Id. (emphasis added).
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analyzing the right of access to different aspects of criminal trials, courts
have looked not to the history of criminal trials only, but to the particular
process in question. 161
D.

THE COURT IMPROPERLY SHIFTS THE BURDEN TO THE PLAINTIFFS

When turning to application of the Richmond Newspapers test the
court announced a major departure, not only from precedents of Richmond
and its progeny, but of First Amendment jurisprudence in general. They
quoted the general Richmond Newspapers test language from PressEnterprise II which states: when considering a First Amendment right of
access, a court must "consider[ ] whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public ... [and] whether

public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.' 162 Adding nothing more, the Third Circuit
said "[t]his language seems to place the burden of proof on the party
alleging a First Amendment right."'' 63 Not only did the court give no
rationale for this conclusion, the conclusion was inconsistent with
Richmond and its progeny, as well as First Amendment jurisprudence. 64
This is not the first time the Third Circuit has walked down this path,
however. In Capital Cities, the court imposed without announcing, a
pleading requirement upon the plaintiff to allege that access has
traditionally been afforded to the public. 65 This approach does not seem to
have been followed since the 1986 Capital Cities decision anywhere
outside. the Third Circuit with the exception of one 1988 decision in the
Western District of Oklahoma.' 66 Interestingly, though, the Third Circuit
itself did not follow this burden-shifting approach in its 1994 decision in
United States v. Simone.167 Indeed, in that case, the Third Circuit clearly
put the burden on the government to "establish a tradition of closure.' 6 g In
short, in North Jersey Media Group, the Third Circuit imposed a burden

161.
E.g., Press-Enterprise /,464 U.S. 501 (1984); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d
550 (3d Cir. 1982).
162.

Press-Enterprise it,478 U.S. 1,8 (1986).

N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209.
163.
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1190 (1986) (Gibbons, J.,
164.
dissenting) (finding no opinion with such a burden in the Richmond line of cases and that
long-settled First Amendment jurisprudence imposes the burden upon the government).
Id. at 1175-76.
165.
Combined Communications Corp. of Okla. v. Boger, 689 F. Supp. 1065 (W.D.
166.
Okla. 1988).
14 F.3d 833, 837-38 (1994).
167.
168.
Id. at 838.
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upon the plaintiff to meet the Richmond Newspapers test which is
inconsistent with both general precedent, as well as its own precedent.
E.
THE COURT CREATES A STANDARD FOR A PRESUMPTION OF OPENNESS
IN THE EXPERIENCE PRONG THAT IS GREATER THAN THAT INTENDED BY
RICHMOND

In applying the experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers test,

the Third Circuit characterized the Supreme Court in Richmond as
"emphasiz[ing] it had not found 'a single instance of a criminal trial
conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the
history of this country. ' 69 Additionally, they found "the tradition of
openness of deportation proceedings does not meet the standard required
by Richmond Newspapers, or even its Third Circuit progeny" of an
"unbroken, uncontradicted history" of public access to criminal trials. 7 °
Noting that deportation procedures have been codified for almost 100
years, they rebutted that "Congress has never explicitly guaranteed public
access."1 71 While these individual contentions appear valid at first blush,
when used together by the Third Circuit, they improperly create a standard
beyond that which the Court in Richmond originally intended.
1.

The Oliver Quotation

When the Third Circuit Appeals Court in North Jersey v. Ashcroft
says the Supreme Court in Richmond emphasized the comment about not
finding any criminal trials conducted in camera, this is a
mischaracterization.
The Appeals Court cites pages 565-73 of the
Richmond decision for this contention. 72 The exact quotation, however, is
found on page 573. 173 While it is possible the Appeals Court meant to
contend that the material on all pages between 565-73 amounts to an
emphasis that no single instance of an in camera trial had been found, there
are several reasons that is not a valid interpretation.
First, while the first four pages of the material cited discussed the
history of criminal trials, and that this history seems to show criminal trials
were open to the public, the final four pages center on a discussion of the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
Id. at 20 I.
Id.
Id.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
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importance of openness to criminal trials and the positive rationale
17 4
purposes this openness served, moving away from the historical findings.
In fact, the quotation referred to by the Appeals Court in its North Jersey
Media Group decision, appears in a footnote in Richmond that discussed
the Supreme Court's prior recognition of a presumption of openness. 7 5 A
quotation from within a footnote could hardly be said to be an emphasis by
the Supreme Court of the contention cited.
It is doubtful the Supreme Court in Richmond meant to emphasize this
statement for an even more compelling reason. The source of the original
quotation is a case in which a plaintiff was alleging a due process violation
under the Fourteenth Amendment in a trial for contempt.176 Of paramount
importance in that case was the fact that the contempt trial arose within the
context of a one-man grand jury where the accused was tried without the
presence of counsel. 177 This importance is demonstrated a little further
along when, in quoting from that case, the Supreme Court elaborates on
their lack of historical findings for in camera trials:
But, unless in Michigan and in one-man grand jury
contempt cases, no court in this country has ever before
held, so far as we can find, that an accused can be tried,
convicted, and sent to jail, when everybody else is denied
entrance to the court except the judge and his attaches.
And without exception all courts have held that an accused
is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and
no matter with what offense he may be
counsel present,
78
charged.1
Assuming the Supreme Court in Richmond was familiar with the
entire Oliver case when citing it, and the important distinction that the
accused in that case was denied access to counsel, is most likely why this
statement is not elevated from footnote status in the Richmond case.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 565-573.
1d. at 573 n.9.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Id.
Id. at 271-72 (emphasis added).
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2. An Unbroken, UncontradictedHistory is Not Required to Create A
Presumption of Openness Under the Experience Prong of the Richmond
Newspapers Test
The Court in Richmond was asked to find that the "right of the public
and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States
Constitution."' 79 Although it acknowledged, "that neither the Constitution
nor the Bill of Rights contains any provision which by its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials," the Supreme Court
nevertheless found such a right in the First Amendment. 80 In undertaking
its analysis, the Court looked to the history of criminal trials to determine if
the Framers, when crafting the Bill of Rights, would have considered
access to be a fundamental right such as they were trying to guarantee in
the Constitution. 181 While the Court did find an "unbroken, uncontradicted
history" of public access to criminal trials, 8 2 it is not these characteristics
that are pertinent to the determination of a fundamental right, nor do they
create a requirement which needs to be met. Rather, the determinative
inquiry is whether the Framers would have considered the proceeding in
question to be one such as a First Amendment right of access should be
extended. 83 When the court in North Jersey Media Group characterizes an
"unbroken, uncontradicted history" as a requirement to establish a First
Amendment right of access, they have focused on the outcome of the
Richmond Newspapers inquiry and ignored its underlying purpose.
3.

Explicit GuaranteesAre Not Required

Similarly, when the Third Circuit notes that despite deportation
procedures having been codified for nearly 100 years, yet "Congress has
never explicitly guaranteed public access,"' 84 they ignore the fact that in
Richmond, the Supreme Court found an implicit First Amendment right
"absent an explicit provision.' " 85 It was because of the lack of an explicit
guarantee that the Supreme Court in Richmond had to infer an implicit

179.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558.
180.
Id. at 575.
181.
See Id. "Public access to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the
process itself." Id. (emphasis added).
182.
Id.
183.
Id.
184.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 201.
185.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
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guarantee from the nature of criminal trials. 86 Had the Richmond Court
had a regulatory presumption of openness, as exists in North Jersey Media
Group, it is doubtful they would have felt it necessary to conduct such an
inquiry, but would rather have directly applied strict scrutiny.
F.
LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO OPENNESS ARE NOT FATAL TO A
PRESUMPTION OF OPENNESS

Richmond and its Supreme Court progeny are replete with limited
exceptions to a general tradition of openness where a presumption of
openness was nevertheless found. 87 In Press-EnterpriseH the Court noted
that "several States ...have allowed preliminary hearings to be closed on
the motion of the accused ...[b]ut even in these States the proceedings are
presumptively open to the public."' 88 Noting this exception to the openness
of preliminary hearings, the dissent felt "the Court's historical evidence
proves too little,"' 89 yet the majority rejected this and found a presumption
of openness in preliminary hearings. 190
Similarly, in Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"criminal trials have not always been open to the press and general public
during the testimony of minor sex victims."' 9' However, they stated
"Richmond Newspapers ...discerned a First Amendment right of access to
criminal trials based in part on the recognition that as a general matter
criminal trials have long been presumptively open."'' 92 Finally, the Court in
Richmond itself noted that a trial judge may, "in the interest of the fair
administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a
trial."' 9 All of these cases noted exceptions to the history of openness, yet
the Supreme Court still found a presumption of openness, which resulted in
a qualified First Amendment right to the proceeding in question. When the
court in North Jersey Media Group allowed the limited exceptions to the

See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
186.
See Press-EnterpriseH,478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. 501
187.
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 11.
188.
Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189.
See Press EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
190.
Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 605 n. 13.
191.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. at 505. "[Slince
192.
the development of trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a
public process with exceptions only for good cause shown." Id.
193.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18.
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explicit regulation providing for a presumption to be fatal to the experience
prong inquiry, they were clearly not following Supreme Court precedent.
VI.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

With this case creating a circuit split, and considering the important
issues at stake, it's widely anticipated that this issue will soon find its way
to the Supreme Court. 94 Any outcome is far from clear. On the one hand,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been quoted as approving of the Latin maxim:
In time of war, the laws are silent.195 Given this proclivity, "[m]any court
watchers believe that the Rehnquist court, by and large, will bow to the
government's assertion of authority."'' 96 Indeed, historically, "the Supreme
Court has been very deferential to claims of national security in times of
crises."' 97 However, some believe the Supreme Court may not give the
Executive Branch such war-time deference unless it finds we are indeed in
a state of war.' 98 Others note the 2001 decision in the Zadvydas case that
deportation hearings are subject to habeas corpus review and believe
"[e]ven a war won't move the Supreme Court to reverse itself that
quickly."' 99 Given that historically, the public, as well as the Court, has
usually recognized such deference to be an error after the crisis has
2
passed,
00 will the Court really just rubber stamp the Executive Branch's
unilateral,
categorical determination in the Creppy Directive?

194.

See, e.g., Third Circuit Finds Creppy Memo Constitutional, 79 No. 41
1577 (2002); Marcia Coyle, War, Liberty: Justices Face Hard

INTERPRETER RELEASES

Decisions, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 11, 2002; Barry J. Lipson, Federally
Speaking, 4 No. 24 LAW. J. 16, Nov. 29, 2002; Closed Hearings Violate FirstAmendment

Rights, MINN. DAILY, Jan. 20, 2002, at 2002 WL 101461220.
195.
Coyle, supra note 194. "The courts, for their part, have largely reserved the
decisions favoring civil liberties in wartime to be handed down after the war was over ...
[a]nd while that may seem a thoroughly undesirable state of affairs to lawyers and judges, in
the greater scheme of things it may be best for all concerned." Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
196.

Id.

197.
Id.
198.
Id. The article quotes Ronald Allen of Northwestern University School of Law
as saying, "Finding a war is being fought will determine if the executive has these
extraordinary powers ...I don't think the Supreme Court will buy a war on terror, a war
that will go on forever." Id.
199.
Tony Mauro, 9/11 The Legal Legacy Little Deference, 225 No. 51 THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 11, 2002, at WL 9/2002 AMLAW 78.
200.
See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Floyd
Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against Terrorism, Address Before the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Sept. 23, 2002), in 5 U. PA. J.CONST. L. I, 10-11
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The answer to that question will hopefully depend more on how the
current Supreme Court decides to interpret Richmond, rather than any
proclivity toward government deference. A look at FMC v. South Carolina
Ports Authority20 may be useful as a starting point. Decided in 2002, five
justices concluded that administrative proceedings were overwhelmingly
similar to civil litigation.2 °2 However, this is a narrow majority which does
not become any clearer when considering that of the four justices still on
the Court who took part in the decisions of Richmond and its progeny,
Rehnquist has consistently refused to find a right of access while O'Connor
and Scalia have been on the side finding a right of access. °3 Stevens has
twice dissented and twice gone with the majority.2°
A.

A DIFFERENT MOSAIC

While a look at prior precedents is not really instructive at making a
prediction of any determination on this point, and past history shows the
Supreme Court usually defers to the Executive Branch during times of
emergency, it's not clear that the Supreme Court would necessary uphold
the Third Circuit's opinion. The government claims that any release of
information may give terrorists a "mosaic" of innocuous pieces of
information that when put together would threaten national security.20 5 But
perhaps the "mosaic" the Court should consider when it makes its ruling, is
2 °6
the one being created by the Bush Administration itself.

(referring to the Alien & Sedition Act of 1789, Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus during the civil war, and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War

11).

201.
535 U.S. 743 (2002).
202.
Id. at 744. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor and
Kennedy formed the majority. Breyer, Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg dissented saying
administrative proceedings are not Article lI judicial proceedings. Id.
203.
See Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. 501
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
204.
See Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. 501
(1984); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555
(1980).
205.
Brief for Appellants at 6, N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-2524) (quoting the Watson Declaration).
206.
See David Cole, Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms, THE NATION, Sept. 23,
2002 at 2002 WL 2210818. "With the exception of the right to bear arms, one would be
hard pressed to name a single constitutional liberty that the Bush Administration has not
overridden in the name of protecting our freedom." Id.
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Were the Creppy Directive issued in isolation as a single response to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it would be easy to consider this right of access
issue solely on that basis. However, this is just one small part of an overall
"mosaic" of government overreaching by the administration which began
even before the attacks.2 °7 The most sweeping measures, however, are
contained in the USA PATRIOT Act.2 °8 The Act, among other things:
gives the government power to search private homes in secret without
informing owners until long after; 2°9 gives the power to "conduct telephone
and e-mail traces of people not suspected of a crime and to investigate
people," without probable cause, "on the basis of activities such as writing
a letter to the editor or attending a rally"; 210 forces bookstores, libraries and
newspapers to reveal confidential records such as titles of books an
individual has purchased or borrowed;21 gives the Attorney General the
power to detain aliens indefinitely, with no hearing or having to show the
alien poses a threat to national security or is a flight risk;21 2 provides
detention can be continued, even after a voluntary deportation or order of
deportation; 2 13 gives the power to seize property without notice and without
a hearing; 214 and allows for the monitoring of attorney-client
*
215
communications.

See Alan Eisner, Bush Expands Government Secrecy, Arouses Critics,
Sept. 3, 2002 at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/09/reO90302.html (last
modified Sept. 4, 2002):
Even before the Sept. I I attacks, the administration was expanding
secrecy. It moved to hold up the release of presidential papers from
former President Ronald Reagan and insisted on keeping secret
members of an energy policy task force chaired by Vice President Dick
Cheney . . . '[t]his administration is the most secretive of our lifetime,
even more secretive than the Nixon administration. They don't believe
the American people or Congress have any right to information,' said
last week Larry Klayman, chairman of Judicial Watch, a conservative
group that is suing the administration to force it to reveal the members
of the energy task force.
Id.
208.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Eisner, supra note 207.
209.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
Cole, supra note 200 at 971; Siobhan Roth, Judiciary Pushes Back Over Anti212.
TerrorTactics, THE RECORDER, May 31, 2002, at WL 5/31/2002 RECORDER-SF 3.
213.
Roth, supra note 212.
Cole, supra note 206.
214.
215.
Kathleen K. Olson, CourtroomAccess After 9/11: A PathologicalPerspective,
7 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 461, 463 (2002), at WL 7 COMMLPOLY 461. See also Coyle, supra
207.

REUTERS,
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The administration has made other changes within the INS as well.
21 6
They have amended a regulation governing detention without charges,
21 7
made a new rule requiring registration and monitoring of certain aliens,
and made another new regulation which allows an INS district director to
keep an alien in detention even if an immigration judge rules after a hearing
that the government has shown no basis for detention.21 8 In addition, the
government has closed the loophole criticized in the opinions of the Sixth
Circuit, as well as the District Court in this case. 219 The new rule provides
that if a client or an attorney leaks information from a closed hearing, the
lawyer may face suspension from practicing in Immigration Court and the
immigration judge shall deny all forms of discretionary relief, except bond,
220
to the respondent.
Other measures taken by the government include trying to control how
and under what circumstances lawyers can meet with their clients22' and
22 3
trying to apply Special Administrative Measures2 2 2 to pre-trial detainees.
In a hearing on the issue, Chief Judge William Young of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts held the SAMs did not apply to

note 194.
216.
Cole, supra note 206. Previously, the INS had to file charges within 24 hours;
however the INS amended that to 48 hours or within a "reasonable" period of time during
times of emergency. In fact, many detainees were held for 50 or more days before being
charged. USA: Post 11 September Detainees Deprived of Their Basic Rights, AMNESTY
INT'L.
ON-LINE
(Mar.
14,
2002),
at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/engamr5l0452002?open &of=eng-usa.
217.
Abrams, supra note 200. See also Nasty Turn on Human Rights in Terror
Fight, THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Dec. 21, 2002 at 2002 WL 103812664.
218.
Review of Custody Determinations, Interim Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909-10 (Oct.
31, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
219.
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (2002) rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002).
220.
Jim Edwards, As Judge Enjoins Blanket Secrecy, U.S. Adopts Rules for Closed
Deport Hearings Provides for Protective Orders and Sanctions for Lawyers Who Flout
Them, N.J.L.J. (June 3, 2002), at WL 168 N.J.L.J. 828 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 3.46 (i)).
221.
Fed. Judge to Supervise Terror Suspect, FINDLAw NEWS & COMMENT.,
December 13, 2002 at http://news.findlaw.com/scripts/ap/o/1 110/12132002 (on file with
Northern Illinois Law Review).
222.
Special Administrative Measures [hereinafter SAMs] are regulations of the
Bureau of Prisons which are created on an ad hoc basis by which the incarceration of an
especially dangerous inmate may have restrictions imposed upon them. Attorneys must
agree in writing to abide by the SAMs or be denied access to their clients. Roth, supra note
212.
223.
Roth, supra note 212. The Justice Department tried to impose an SAM on
alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid which would allow monitoring of attorney-client
conversations. The attorney refused and filed suit objecting. Id.
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Reid as he is not a prisoner in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, but a
pre-trial detainee. The judge commented: "[i]f the executive seeks to
subject him to the strictures of a prisoner, they know what to do. They
that he is guilty of one or more of the crimes with which he is
must prove
224
charged."
It is no doubt this type of result the administration is trying to avoid by
its reliance on the declaration of individuals as "enemy combatants." This
designation allows that "with no meaningful judicial review, any American
citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely
The
without charges or counsel on the government's say so." 225
government considers that "such detainees have no legal rights because Mr.
Bush has designated them 'enemy combatants'. ' 226 While plans for using
Military Tribunals have not been finalized, President Bush's July 16, 2002
report entitled "National Strategy for Homeland Security", calls for a
review of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the military from
acting within the civilian realm.227
B.

SOME REALLY PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES

Given the no doubt compelling interests at stake in trying to prevent
terrorism, why should the Supreme Court care about the big-picture
"mosaic" of the government's reaction to September 11th? Ignoring this
big picture, and allowing the unilateral, overreaching actions of the
government to go unchecked is what will lead to perverse consequences.
Employing a double standard, such as the government is engaged in, of
treating aliens and American citizens accused of terrorist activities as
persons without the basic rights guaranteed in the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, "is likely to be counterproductive. 2 28 It undermines our
legitimacy both here and abroad. 229 At home, the tactics of the government

224.
225.
226.
CHRISTIAN

Id.
Abrams, supra note 200.
Warren Richey, Case Tests Limits of Holding Citizens in Military Prison,THE
SCl. MONITOR, Oct. 28, 2002 at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1028/p02s02-

usju.html.
227. See Evan P. Schultz, The Evil Ones: How Can We Tell Terrorists From Plain
Old Buy Guys?, LEGALTIMES, July 29, 2002 at WL 7/29/2002 LEGALTIMES 36.
228. Cole, supra note 200 at 958.
229. Id. See also James Vicini, U.S. Lawyers Group Opposes 9/11 Secret Detentions,
at
2002
13,
Aug.
COMMENT.,
&
NEWS
FINDLAW
http://news.findlaw.com/news/s/20O20813/attackdetentionsdc.html (on file with Northern
Illinois University Law Review) (reporting that The American Bar Association adopted a
recommendation opposing the incommunicado detention of foreign nationals in undisclosed
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are likely to alienate the very communities that could give the most
assistance identifying possible threats. 230 At the international level, "if we
are seen as fighting for our own parochial interests and not for the interests
of justice and peace more broadly, we are likely to inspire more people to
take up the mantle of terrorism against us. '' 231 The harder we "crack-down"
on what others perceive of as anti-Arab or anti-Muslim activities, "the
more likely bin Laden or others will be able to attract adherents to their
232
terrorist cause against US.,
CONCLUSION
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft233 addresses the issue of
whether an Executive Branch official can issue a mandatory blanket
closure order for deportation hearings stemming from detentions which
occurred after the September I Ith terrorist attacks. The Third Circuit
Appeals Court in this case concluded that deportation hearings did not have
the "unbroken, uncontradicted history" necessary to enable a qualified First
Amendment fundamental right of access to be found in the proceedings,
which created a split between the Third and Sixth Circuits. As a
consequence, this issue will probably reach the Supreme Court soon.
While the national security concerns cited in the Creppy Directive are no
doubt substantial and legitimate, a categorical blanket closure of any
deportation hearing unilaterally determined by the Attorney General as
being of "special interest" goes too far. The case-by-case closure required
by the Sixth Circuit, as well as the lower court in this case, is a remedy
which addresses both national security and First Amendment concerns.
While the Supreme Court usually defers to the judgment of the
Executive Branch during war times, the Court should look at the larger
mosaic of the many executive restrictions enacted both before and since the
terrorist attacks. If they do, perhaps we can avoid walking down the path
of overreaction in times of crisis. 234 We, as well as the Supreme Court,
locations by the Immigration and Naturalization Service).
230.
See John Solomon, U.S. Officials Building Cases Against Americans Suspected
of Supporting Terror Groups, ASSOcIATED
PRESS,
Aug. 28,
2002, at
http://www.labelletrial.de/aktuell/div/new%20jersey%20online.htm (last viewed April 28,
2003) (asserting that "American Muslim activists have questioned whether the
[government's] efforts amount to harassment of Arab-Americans or racial profiling"). Id.
231.
Cole, supra note 200 at 958.
232.
Id. at 988.
233.
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
234.
See Cole, supra note 200 at 955 (referring to the imprisonment of those who
spoke out against the war effort in World War I, the internment of those of Japanese
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would do well to remember "the Framers sought to protect our basic
momentary passions of the majority by inscribing them in
liberties from the 235
the Constitution.,
DAWN M. WEEKLY*

ancestry in World War f, and the various subjections of those caught up in McCarthyism
during the Cold War).
Id. at 956.
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